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Jack Graves* & Yelena Davydan** 
CHAPTER 8 




The doctrines of “separability” and “competence-competence” are often called 
the cornerstones of international commercial arbitration. Distinct, but very much 
related, these two doctrines serve, hand in glove, to maximize the effectiveness 
of arbitration as an efficient means of resolving international commercial 
disputes and to minimize the temptation and effect of delay tactics. Each of these 
principles arises from the autonomous nature of the arbitration agreement, even 
when included as a clause within a broader “container” agreement. 
“Competence-competence” provides an arbitral tribunal with the power to rule on 
its own jurisdiction,1 thus avoiding any need to wait for a court determination of 
the issue and allowing the tribunal to move expeditiously to decide the merits of 
the parties’ broader contract dispute. “Separability” provides that certain defects 
in the container agreement do not affect the arbitration agreement within it, 
unless those defects relate specifically to the arbitration agreement. This allows 
the tribunal to rule in an award on a variety of contract defences without affecting 
its jurisdiction under the arbitration agreement. 
 
 
* Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, NY, USA. 
** Attorney at Strongin Rothman & Abrams, LLP, NY, USA. Ms. Davydan was a visiting scholar 
at UNCITRAL in November and December 2008 and a member of the Touro Law Center team 
in the 15th Annual Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot. 
1  In almost all legal systems, this determination by the tribunal is subject to review by a court of 
competent jurisdiction. This article will suggest, however, that current U.S. law does not provide 
for such review when the parties delegate the jurisdictional issue to the arbitral tribunal. 
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Recognized in almost all modern legal regimes governing arbitration, these two 
doctrines are statutorily codified in most instances.2 However, neither doctrine is 
specifically mentioned anywhere in the text of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”).3 While the basic doctrine of separability was judicially established 
over forty years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court,4 the development of any sort of 
“competence-competence” doctrine has been a much slower process and is only 
now beginning to take on an increasingly clear shape. The purpose of this article 
is to describe the current state of U.S. law on these two doctrines, taking 
particular note of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, 
Inc. v. Jackson5 (Part 2), to suggest a few potential challenges presented by the 
nature of the Court’s current approach (Part 3), and to offer a few predictions as 
to how these doctrines might continue to evolve in the foreseeable future (Part 
4).6 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEPARABILITY AND COMPETENCE-COMPETENCE 
UNDER U.S. LAW 
In Rent-A-Center, the U.S. Supreme Court brought together two distinct lines of 
cases involving separability and competence-competence. When read in 
combination with the Court’s decision in Hall Street Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc.,7 the 
Rent-A-Center decision not only grants a tribunal the power to determine its own 
jurisdiction, but seemingly gives the tribunal the “final” word on the matter, 
without any subsequent court review. This newly emerging doctrinal confluence 
bears a remarkable resemblance to the German form of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
 
2  See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, Article 16(1) (both 
competence-competence and separability); English Arbitration Act of 1996, Article 30(1) 
(competence-competence) and Article 7 (separability); Swiss Federal Statute on Private 
International Law, Article 186(1) and Article 178(3) (separability); French Code of Civil 
Procedure Article 1466 (competence-competence); but see Jean-Francois Poudret & Sebastien 
Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration (Kluwer, 2007), 132 (noting the judicial 
recognition of the principle of separability through a series of decisions by French Courts). 
3  See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307. 
4  See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
5  130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010). 
6  At the outset, one might reasonably ask why an 85-year-old statute requires the continuing 
development of a significant body of “common law” on the subject. However, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has long ago “abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to 
the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.” Allied Bruce Terminix 
Co. v Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Margaret Moses, 
‘Statutory Misconstruction: How The Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never 
Enacted by Congress’, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 99, 99-100 (2006). 
7  552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
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that pre-existed Germany’s 1998 adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law.8 In 
order to better understand the genesis of the Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center, a 
brief history of separability (2.1.) and competence-competence (2.2.) under the 
FAA is useful. Then, following a brief detour to explore the significance of Hall 
Street (2.3.), we can more fully explore the significance of the Court’s rule and 
reasoning in Rent-A-Center (2.4.). 
2.1. Separability 
In 1967, the Supreme Court first adopted the doctrine of separability under the 
FAA in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,9 a case involving a 
contract defence based on “fraud in the inducement.” Prima Paint argued that the 
contract, including the arbitration clause, was procured by fraud, and it would not 
have made any contract all with Flood and Conklin, but for the fraudulent 
misrepresentations at issue.10 Thus, a court first had to determine whether the 
fraud vitiated the alleged arbitration agreement.11 However, the majority relied 
on the language of FAA section 4, limiting court review to “only issues relating 
to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”12 
 
Because Prima Paint made no specific allegations of fraud targeting the 
arbitration agreement, itself, the case raised no issue for judicial determination 
under section 4’s very limited scope. Thus, the district court was required to send 
the parties to arbitration to resolve their contract dispute – including any question 
of fraud in the inducement of the contract containing the arbitration clause.13 The 
Supreme Court further buttressed its opinion by reference to the purpose of the 
FAA to provide a speedy process and the inevitable potential for delay and 
obstruction if invalidity defences had to be heard by courts.14 Finally, the Court 
noted that the scope of the parties’ arbitration agreement clearly included 
contract validity, thus requiring a reference of this issue to arbitration.15 
 
8  Lew, Mistelis & Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, (Kluwer, 2003), 
338-39; Gerold Zeiler & Katarina Hruskovicova, ‘The Principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
According to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration’, in The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: 25 Years, 109, 109 (2010). 
9  388 U.S. 395. 
10  Id. at 408, 415, 423-24 (J. Black dissenting). 
11  Id. 
12  Id. at 403-04. 
13  Id. 
14  Id. at 404. 
15  Id. at 397, 406. 
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The Supreme Court’s next significant case on separability arose almost 40 years 
later, when it extended the doctrine from voidable to void contracts in Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna. 16  In explaining why the doctrine of 
“severability”17 applied equally to voidable or void contracts, Justice Scalia 
shifted the focus to FAA section 2.18 Whereas, the Court’s holding in Prima 
Paint had relied upon a narrow reading of any judicial review under section 4, its 
holding in Buckeye relied on a broad reading of the word “contract” in section 2 
to include “contracts that later prove to be void.”19 The Court also addressed the 
basic practical problem that the doctrine of separability attempts to resolve. An 
arbitrator’s decision that the main contract is void would logically deprive the 
arbitrator of jurisdiction, absent the doctrine of separability. However, a court’s 
decision that the main contract is valid would deprive the parties’ of their 
arbitration agreement. Separability resolves this “conundrum” in favour of 
arbitration, consistent with the Court’s general pro-arbitration approach.20 In 
effect, section 2 requires a broad application of separability to give effect to the 
parties’ arbitration agreement. 
 
In at least one respect, Buckeye was a much easier case than Prima Paint, 
because the issue of “consent” was not in dispute. There was no question that 
Cardegna had consented to his putative contract with Buckeye – the issue was 
solely whether that contract was legal under Florida law. While the case drew 
strong criticisms from consumer rights advocates, the Court was virtually 
unanimous in its view that the application of separability was appropriate in this 
case.21 Thus, by the time the Rent-A-Center case arose, the basic doctrine of 
separability appeared to be fully established and accepted by the entire Court. Of 
significant note, however, the Court had specifically avoided, and reserved for 
another day, the arguably thornier question of the potential application of 
separability to questions of contract formation (as opposed to invalidity).22 
 
16  546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
17  “Severability” is the current term used by the Supreme Court. See id. at 445-47. This article will 
generally use the more common term, “separability.” 
18  Id. at 447. 
19  Id. at 448. 
20  Id. at 448-49. 
21  Justice Thomas dissented solely based on his view that the FAA does not apply in state courts. 
See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 549. There was no disagreement regarding the basic doctrine of 
separability. 
22  Id. at 444, n. 1. As discussed below, this issue is the subject of Part 4. 
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2.2. Competence-Competence 
In judicially fashioning the doctrine of separability, the Supreme Court was not 
required to overcome any contrary statutory language. In contrast, a tribunal’s 
authority to determine its own jurisdiction under the FAA must overcome section 
4, specifically assigning to courts the question of whether the parties agreed to 
arbitration. The Court has characterized this issue as a “question of 
arbitrability.”23 This question of “arbitrability,” as the Court uses the term in this 
context, includes questions of the existence, validity, and scope of any arbitration 
agreement. 24  While consistently applying a presumption in favour of 
“arbitrability” in deciding whether a dispute is subject to arbitration, the Court 
explained in First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan25 the requirement of a contrary 
presumption with respect to who should decide this question.26 This presumption 
that a court must decide “arbitrability” may be overcome only by “clear and 
unmistakable” evidence that the parties wish to delegate this authority to the 
arbitral tribunal.27 
 
The original articulation of this “clear and unmistakable” standard actually arose 
from a limitation on the authority of an arbitrator. In holding that a court must 
determine the scope of an arbitration clause within a collective bargaining 
agreement, the Supreme Court explained in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. 
Communications Workers of America28 that the question of “arbitrability” is 
undeniably an issue for judicial determination, “unless the parties clearly and 
unmistakably provide otherwise.” This standard could easily have been restricted 
to the question of scope, which was the sole issue in AT&T.29 However, in First 
Options, the Court further detailed and expanded the affirmative possibility that 
the parties could delegate questions of “arbitrability,” generally, provided their 
intent to do so was sufficiently “clear and unmistakable.” 30  Perhaps most 
 
23  First Options, 514 U.S. at 942-43; Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 84 
(2002); Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2777. This same term, “arbitrability,” is more typically used 
on a very limited basis to address the issue of whether the subject matter of a given claim may 
be arbitrated. Here, the authors will generally avoid using the term “arbitrability,” except where 
specifically focusing on the Court’s actual use of the term. 
24  Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84. 
25  514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
26  Id. at 944-45. 
27  Id. at 944. 
28  475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986). 
29  Id. at 646-47. 
30  First Options, 514 U.S. at 943-45. 
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significantly, the Court anchored this contractual form of competence-
competence in FAA section 2. 
 
The Court explained that subjecting the basic jurisdictional question to arbitration 
was no different than subjecting any other contract dispute to arbitration.31 Each 
is based on the parties’ agreement, and an arbitrator’s decision on either is 
subject to the same limited standard of review under FAA section 10.32 The only 
difference between a provision for arbitration of the parties’ main contract 
dispute and a provision for the arbitrators to decide their own jurisdiction was 
this apparently heightened standard of consent, requiring “‘clear and 
unmistakable’ evidence.”33 The Court’s characterization of what it later would 
call a “delegation” agreement as no different from any other arbitration 
agreement under section 2 raised a number of questions and generated 
considerable commentary.34 What sort of consent is required to meet this “clear 
and unmistakable” standard? Does the Court’s reliance on FAA section 2 mean 
that an arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction is largely unreviewable, except under 
the narrow scope of section 10?  
 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the first question, the vast majority 
of courts have held that a mere incorporation of arbitration rules providing for 
competence-competence is sufficiently “clear and unmistakable” to vest the 
tribunal with the power to decide its own jurisdiction.35 The Supreme Court has 
significantly clarified the answer to the second question in Rent-A-Center. 
However, before turning to Rent-A-Center, a brief discussion of Hall Street is 
necessary. 
2.3. A Brief Detour: Limits on Expanded Judicial Review After Hall Street 
Hall Street had nothing to do with separability or competence-competence 
directly. However, its outcome arguably has a profound effect on the nature of 
the latter. Hall Street raised the question of whether the grounds for vacatur 
 
31  Id. at 943. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. at 944-45. 
34  See, e.g., William W. Park, ‘The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic’, 12 Arbitration Int’l 137 (1996). 
35  See Joseph L. Franco, Note, ‘Casually Finding the Clear and Unmistakable: A Re-Evaluation of 
First Options in Light of Recent Lower Court Decisions’, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 443, 469-70 
(2006).  
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under FAA section 10 are exclusive or may be supplemented by contract.36 In 
holding the statutory grounds exclusive, the Court focused on the mandatory 
language of section 10, stating that a court “must” confirm the award, “unless” 
the party resisting confirmation established one or more of the statutory 
grounds.37 The Court further explained that allowing for expanded judicial 
review risked significantly complicating the arbitration process in contravention 
of its natural informal and efficient character.38 Thus, any decision entrusted to 
an arbitral tribunal under FAA section 2 is final and binding, subject to court 
review only under the narrow grounds of section 10. Notably, these grounds do 
not include any claim that the parties did not conclude a valid arbitration 
agreement. 39  Having established the finality of a tribunal’s decision under 
section 2, we can now more fully explore the significance of the Court’s decision 
in Rent-A-Center. 
2.4. A Remarkable, Yet Predictable, Convergence in Rent-A-Center 
Rent-A-Center “lies at a seeming crossroads in [the Court’s] arbitration 
jurisprudence,” and represents a convergence of the Court’s previously distinct 
lines of cases addressing separability and contractual competence-competence.40 
While acknowledging this apparent convergence, the dissent seemed quite 
shocked by the result, even calling into question the doctrine of separability so 
broadly embraced in Buckeye.41 However, if one simply reads Buckeye and First 
Options for what they quite clearly said, it’s hard to see how the Court’s decision 
in Rent-A-Center is anything but predictable (Section (a)). Of perhaps more 
surprise is the effect of the further convergence of Rent-A-Center and Hall Street, 
which appear to provide the arbitrators with not only the “first” word on arbitral 
jurisdiction, but arguably the last (Section (b)). The decision also raises an 
interesting issue in treating the “delegation” clause as separable from the 
arbitration agreement in exactly the same way the arbitration agreement is 
separable from the main contract. One might reasonably ask just how deeply this 
sort of “nesting”42 might go (Section (c)). 
 
36  Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 578. 
37  Id. at 582, 587. 
38  Id. at 588. 
39  See 9 U.S.C. § 10.  
40  Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2785 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
41  See id. at 2785 (calling the decision in Prima Paint “‘fantastic’ and likely erroneous”). 
42  Id. at 2786 (characterizing the majority’s application of separability in these circumstances as 
“something akin to Russian nesting dolls”). 
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(a) The Treatment of “Delegation” as an Arbitration Agreement, and the 
Predictable Application of Separability That Logically Follows  
In Rent-A-Center, 43  the issue of contractual “competence-competence” was 
squarely presented. The Rent-A-Center contract executed by its employee, 
Jackson, included a provision within the arbitration agreement, “clearly and 
unmistakably” delegating to the arbitral tribunal the authority to decide its own 
jurisdiction, and assigning this decisional authority on an “exclusive” initial 
basis, though still subject to later judicial review.44 Thus, the hypothetical 
possibility raised earlier in the First Options dicta was now squarely before the 
Supreme Court. Rent-A-Center predictably relied on First Options in arguing 
that this provision was fully enforceable, as written.45 The Court need do no 
more than apply controlling precedent to the facts before it. 
 
Jackson asserted an unconscionability defence to the purported arbitration 
agreement46 and wanted the issue decided by a court under FAA section 4 – not 
by an arbitrator.47 Jackson argued that an arbitrator’s authority to determine 
jurisdiction could not logically rely on the very agreement that Jackson was 
contesting as unconscionable. 48  This would of course amount to a classic 
example of circular reasoning. Jackson also suggested a way the Court might 
reasonably limit the First Options dicta, arguing that the Court merely stated that 
the parties could grant the arbitral tribunal the authority to determine the “scope” 
of their arbitration agreement, provided the parties actually had an enforceable 
 
43  130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010). 
44  See Joint Appendix, Motion to Dismiss Proceedings and Compel Arbitration by Defendant 
Rent-A-Center West, Inc., filed March 14, 2007, Exhibit 1 at 29, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497). Under the parties’ agreement, this “exclusivity” 
was purely temporal. The arbitral tribunal would have the exclusive opportunity to decide the 
issue – as an initial matter. However, this decision was later to be subject to plenary court 
review under the parties’ agreement. Id. As more fully explained below, the effect of the Court’s 
decision in Hall Street likely renders this provision for plenary review ineffective. Interestingly, 
the agreement also delegated issues regarding the “formation” of the arbitration agreement to the 
arbitrators. Id. 
45  Brief for the Petitioner at 11-14, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010) 
(No. 09-497). 
46  Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 
09-497). Jackson asserted that the arbitration agreement, specifically, was unconscionable, 
thereby attempting to avoid the doctrine of separability. Id. at 7-8. 
47  See Brief for Respondent at 10-11, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010) 
(No. 09-497) 
48  Id. at 10. 
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arbitration agreement in the first instance.49 However, Jackson argued, the latter 
issue was necessarily one for the courts – no matter what the parties’ agreement 
said.50 
 
As presented, this case seemed to require the Court to either: (1) follow the First 
Options dicta to its logical conclusion, enforcing the parties’ contractual 
delegation of “competence-competence” to the arbitrators; or (2) explain that the 
Court did not really mean precisely what it said in First Options, and in some 
manner limit the holding of that decision. In a 5-4 decision, the Court took the 
first course and did so, in large part, by relying on the doctrine of separability.51 
Taken at face value, the dicta from First Options had said, quite clearly, that the 
parties could delegate jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrator, whose decision on 
the issue would be equally final to that of a decision on the merits – as long as 
this delegation was “clear and unmistakable.” Thus, unless the Court was 
prepared to in some way “refine” its earlier First Options dicta, its decision in 
Rent-A-Center was virtually a foregone conclusion – the question of whether 
Jackson’s agreement to arbitrate might be unconscionable and, therefore, invalid 
had been “clearly and unmistakably” delegated to the arbitrator. 
 
What apparently surprised some,52 including the dissent,53 was the majority’s 
application of the doctrine of separability under the circumstances of this case. 
However, if the parties’ “delegation” of the jurisdictional decision to the 
arbitrator is no different than their “delegation” of the decision on the merits of 
their main contract dispute, then the majority’s approach seems perfectly logical. 
The “delegation provision” is logically separable from the arbitration agreement 
in exactly the same manner that the arbitration agreement is separable from the 
main contract, of which it often forms a part.54 Moreover, this application of 
separability is fully consistent with its purpose. Absent the doctrine of 
separability, the arbitrator would be empowered only to make a positive decision 
on jurisdiction pursuant to the “delegation” clause, because a negative decision 
 
49  As noted supra, Part 2.2, the original AT&T decision was limited to the issue of scope, and a 
number of commentators had suggested such a limitation with respect to the First Options dicta, 
see, e.g., Park, ‘The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options’, supra note 34 at 142. 
50  Brief for Respondent at 23-31, Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 
09-497). 
51  See generally Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. 2772. 
52  See, e.g., Karen Halverson Cross, ‘Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges’, 
26 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. ___, ___ (forthcoming) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552966. 
53  See Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
54  Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2777-79. 
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would deprive the arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction on the “delegation” question, 
thereby negating the preclusive effect of any decision. 
 
The problem with the Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center does not lie in its 
application of separability in that particular case. Instead, the problem arises from 
the earlier First Options dicta and the entire notion of contractual “competence-
competence” under the FAA, which the majority in Rent-A-Center simply 
applied as previously articulated. 
(b) Is the Arbitrator’s Decision Ever Subject to Judicial Review? 
The arbitration agreement at issue in Rent-A-Center included a provision for 
expanded judicial review of any decision of the arbitrator. Thus, while granting 
the arbitrator exclusive authority to make the initial determination, the agreement 
preserved the right of an objecting party to subsequent judicial review of the 
issue of whether the parties had concluded a valid arbitration agreement. 
However, this provision is almost certainly ineffective today based on the Court’s 
decision in Hall Street, strictly limiting judicial review to the very narrow 
grounds provided in FAA section 10,55 which do not include this question.56 
Thus, if we read Rent-A-Center and Hall Street together, as written, they suggest 
the arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction will be final and, essentially, 
unreviewable – at any stage – under the Court’s interpretation of contractual 
competence-competence.57 The reason for this somewhat bizarre result is found 
in the basic statutory structure of FAA Chapter 1. 
 
FAA section 4 provides that a court “shall hear the parties” as to whether their 
dispute is subject to a valid arbitration agreement.58 FAA section 9 provides that 
a court “must grant” a request for confirmation of an arbitral award, unless 
vacated under section 10.59 On one hand, if each of these provisions is read as a 
 
55  Hall Street, 552 U.S. 576.  
56  See 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
57  Interestingly, a tribunal’s decision under a “delegation” agreement that the parties did not agree 
to arbitration of their primary dispute would also be fully binding on a court that would 
otherwise have jurisdiction over that dispute, because the decision under the “delegation” 
agreement would be an “award” subject to full preclusive effect – just like any other award. 
Thus, a court could not send the parties to arbitration, even if it disagreed with the tribunal’s 
decision under the “delegation” agreement. 
58  9 U.S.C. § 4. 
59  9 U.S.C. § 9. Section 9 also provides an exception where the award is subject to modification or 
correction under section 11; however, this provision has no bearing on the instant analysis. 
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mandatory rule – as one might reasonably read “shall” and “must” – then a court 
will always decide the jurisdictional issue as a threshold matter, and there is no 
need for subsequent review.60 On the other hand, if each of these provisions is 
read as a default rule, then the parties are free to contract for competence-
competence, notwithstanding section 4, and the parties are also free to contract 
for judicial review of the arbitrator’s jurisdictional decision, notwithstanding 
sections 9 and 10. In fact, this is precisely what Rent-A-Center attempted to do in 
its arbitration agreement with Jackson. However, the Court has decided to read 
section 4 as a default rule, while reading sections 9 and 10 as mandatory.61 Thus, 
any decision to delegate a court’s section 4 authority to an arbitrator effectively 
leaves the parties without any judicial review on this issue.62 
 
The FAA, as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court, seemingly provides for 
a contractual version of competence-competence that looks very much like the 
doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz that pre-existed Germany’s adoption of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.63 Notably, however, the German doctrine required the 
execution of a delegation agreement that was physically separate from the 
arbitration.64 In contrast, even this minimal requirement is absent from the 
doctrine announced in Rent-A-Center. Moreover, this German version of 
arguably absolute Kompetenz-Kompetenz was abandoned in 1998 with 
Germany’s adoption of new legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law.65 
It would appear that it has now re-emerged in the United States under the FAA. 
(c) How Deep Can the “Nesting” Go? 
A recalcitrant respondent might still try to avoid arbitration by attacking the 
validity of “delegation” clause. Assuming a viable argument for invalidity, a 
court would seemingly have to decide the issue under FAA section 4. However, 
one might reasonably ask if this “nesting” concept might be effectively infinite if 
 
60  The district court’s decision will still be subject to a standard appeal process, see 9 U.S.C. § 16, 
but would not be subject to any subsequent review in an action to vacate the award. 
61  See David Horton, Essay, ‘The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act’, 96 
Va. L. Rev. 1, 4-6 (2010). 
62  Any attempt to construe any of the provisions of FAA section 10 to provide for such review is 
likely to present significant challenges, as more fully addressed infra in Part 3.2. 
63  Lew, Mistelis & Kröll, supra note 8 at 338-39. 
64  Id; Zeiler & Hruskovicova, ‘The Principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, supra note 8 at 109. 
65  Lew, Mistelis & Kröll, supra note 8 at 338-39. 
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properly drafted.66 The less “finite” the agreement at “bottom” of the “nest,” the 
more difficult it would be to attack that specific agreement, as required by the 
Court’s application of the doctrine of separability in Rent-A-Center. For example, 
one might draft a clause as follows: 
The Arbitrator, and not any court, shall have exclusive authority to resolve 
any dispute, controversy, or question arising out of, relating to, or 
concerning in any way this arbitration agreement, this delegation agreement, 
or any element thereof, including their formation, interpretation, 
performance, or validity, and including the arbitrability of any dispute, of 
any kind whatsoever, arising between the parties to this contract.67 
Attacking such a clause at its most basic or “bottom” level would seem daunting 
– especially in view of the Court’s strong overall pro-arbitration bias. 
 
The Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center leaves a number of open challenges and 
questions. Two are addressed below. First, to the extent a court cannot review a 
tribunal’s decision on the validity of the parties’ arbitration agreement under 
FAA section 10, how should this potential conflict with Article V of the New 
York Convention be resolved in international arbitration proceedings (Part 3)? 
Second, what do the Court’s past decisions on separability and competence-
competence tell us about how it may resolve the question it specifically reserved 
in Buckeye and Rent-A-Center – how, if at all, does separability operate in cases 
in which contract formation is at issue (Part 4)? 
3. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RENT-A-CENTER WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL 
AWARDS 
Consistent standards for judicial review of arbitral awards help to ensure an 
effective international arbitration regime. Otherwise, an award may be reviewed 
under different standards in different jurisdictions during set aside and 
enforcement proceedings. The New York Convention provides a uniform review 
framework for enforcement proceedings in signatory jurisdictions, but does not 
address standards for vacatur. When the rendering jurisdiction faces proceedings 
to both vacate and enforce an award, consistency between the applicable legal 
instruments is particularly important in view of the significance of vacatur. This 
 
66  In dissenting from the majority decision in Rent-A-Center, Justice Stevens characterized this 
“nesting” effect as akin to Russian dolls. 130 S.Ct. at 2786. In theory, the number of smaller and 
smaller “nested” dolls could be infinite. 
67  This proposed clause is only slightly broader than that actually used by Rent-A-Center. 
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section will address the interplay between the FAA and the New York 
Convention when set aside and enforcement proceedings take place in the United 
States. FAA section 10 vacatur grounds are not identical with enforcement 
exceptions under New York Convention article V, but U.S. courts generally 
reconcile them by employing an “overlapping approach” (Part 3.1.). However, 
Rent-A-Center and Hall Street seemingly create a gap, if not a conflict, between 
the New York Convention and the FAA by providing for absolute unreviewable 
competence-competence (Part 3.2.). 
3.1. The “Overlap” Between the New York Convention and the FAA 
The New York Convention applies to “arbitral awards not considered as 
domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement is 
sought.”68 Chapter 2 of the FAA, the Convention’s implementing legislation in 
the United States, broadly defines such non-domestic awards as those arising out 
of a “commercial” “legal relationship” not “entirely between citizens of the 
United State” or those in which “the relationship involves property located 
abroad, envisages performances or enforcement abroad, or has some other 
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.”69  
 
In line with the statutory definition, U.S. courts routinely apply the New York 
Convention to disputes with international flavour arbitrated in the United States.70 
Such awards fall under the ambit of both the FAA and the New York 
Convention. While the exclusive grounds of FAA section 10 govern the set aside 
proceedings, New York Convention article V applies to enforcement, even when 
it is sought in the United States. Unlike the UNCITRAL Model Law, however, 
the FAA grounds for vacatur do not mirror the non-enforcement grounds under 
the New York Convention. FAA section 10 provides for set aside in the event of 
fraud, partiality, corruption, arbitrator’s misconduct that resulted in prejudice, or 
excess of arbitrators’ powers.71 Accordingly, in the context of cross-petitions to 
enforce and vacate a non-domestic award, U.S. courts must reconcile the vacatur 
 
68  United Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
Article I. 
69  9 U.S.C. § 202. 
70  See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Qiagen Gaithersburg, Inc., 2010 WL 3184228, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2010); Zeiler v. Deitsch, 500 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2007); Indus. Risk 
Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998).  
71  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1)–(4).  
Liber Amicorum Eric Bergsten 
170 
provisions of FAA section 10 and the non-enforcement grounds of New York 
Convention article V. 
 
The courts have settled these inconsistencies by construing the FAA and the New 
York Convention as providing “overlapping coverage” to the extent they do not 
conflict.72 For example, relying on article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, 
the courts first apply FAA section 10 in determining whether an award is 
enforceable, which may, in effect, give rise to additional enforcement exceptions. 
After Rent-A-Center, the Ninth Circuit in Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Systems, Inc.73 
confirmed the idea that the FAA vacatur grounds “generally track those under the 
New York Convention” and stated that it could “look to authority under the 
FAA” when determining whether to enforce under the New York Convention. As 
discussed below, Rent-A-Center and Hall Street seemingly create a gap, rather 
than an overlap, between these two instruments in the context of a challenge to 
arbitral jurisdiction. 
3.2 . The “Gap” Between the New York Convention and the FAA 
Under Rent-A-Center and Hall Street, the arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction is 
unreviewable under either section 4 or section 10 of the FAA, if so delegated by 
the parties. Let us assume that a U.S. court is faced with cross-petitions to 
enforce and vacate a nondomestic award, which is challenged based on the 
invalidity of an arbitration agreement containing a delegation provision. While 
the New York Convention article V(1)(a) clearly contemplates judicial review of 
this challenge, FAA section 10 does not. Given that section 10 provisions are 
exclusive, courts presumably cannot use the New York Convention enforcement 
exceptions to vacate an award based on the “overlapping” approach. As a result, 
an award cannot be vacated when the validity of the arbitration agreement is 
challenged, but a court may refuse enforcement of such an award. Therefore, at 
least in the context of a challenge to the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, the FAA and the 
New York Convention do not “overlap,” but rather leave a significant gap. Most 
importantly, this gap seemingly leads to a rather impractical result because, 
absent a vacation mechanism, a party challenging arbitral jurisdiction is forced to 
oppose enforcement in potentially several jurisdictions. 
 
72  See, e.g., Bergsen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir. 1983); Yusuf Ahmed 
Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1997); Publicis Communication 
v. True North Communications, 206 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2000); Industrial Risk Insurers v. 
M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte, 141 F.3d at 1443 n. 10.  
73  2010 WL 3768064, at *3 (9th Cir. 2010).  
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It is unclear whether any effective “gap fillers” exist that would avoid the issue. 
Arguably, the courts may attempt to reconcile the instruments, but whether such 
reconciliation is possible when dealing with missing, rather than additional, 
grounds under the FAA is an open question. One may suggest that a challenge to 
arbitral jurisdiction may be read into FAA section 10(a)(4) addressing a decision 
exceeding the arbitrators’ powers. While Hall Street interpreted Section 10 
provisions as exclusive, it left open the question of whether the judicially 
developed vacatur ground, “manifest disregard of the law,”74 falls within the 
specific section 10 grounds.75 Some courts continue to apply the “manifest 
disregard” standard characterizing it as a “judicial gloss” on the section 10 
provisions,76 while others consider that Hall Street eliminated this standard.77 
However, the Supreme Court has continued to reserve the issue for future 
decision.78 As long as the question remains open, courts may attempt to employ 
the same approach with a challenge to arbitral jurisdiction. Such approach, 
however, may open the proverbial “Pandora’s box” to review of arbitral awards 
on the merits. Inasmuch as the Court has said that a “delegation” agreement is 
just another arbitration agreement, any attempt to review the arbitrator’s decision 
on jurisdiction would open the door to the same standard of review of the main 
contract dispute. Even Hall Street emphasizes that section 10 is limited by the 
extraordinary nature of its specific grounds and cannot serve as a means for 
expansion of judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision.79 
 
 
74  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182 (1953).  
75  Hall Street, 52 U.S. at 585.  
76  Ario v. Cologne Reinsurance (Barbados), Ltd., 2009 WL 3818626, at *5 (M.D. Pa Nov. 13, 
2009) (concluding that the “manifest disregard” standard is a “judicial gloss” on FAA section 10 
specific grounds for vacatur); Stolt-Neilsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d 
Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, Stolt-Neilsen SA v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 
(2010).  
77  Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120, 124 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008); Robert Lewis 
Rosen Assocs., Ltd. v. Webb, 566 F. Supp.2d 228, 233 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 7, 2008); Prime 
Therapeutics LLC v. Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp.2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. May 21, 2008). 
78  See Stolt-Neilsen SA, 130 S.Ct. at 1768. 
79  Hall Street, 52 U.S. at 586. The Supreme Court explained that the parties could not 
contractually expand judicial review. Id. Relying on the principle of ejusdem generis, the Court 
reasoned that even if the statutory vacatur grounds impliedly included any general terms, those 
general terms are “confined to covering subjects comparable to the specifics.” Id. Judicial 
review for a legal error is not, however, comparable to fraud and corruption. Id. Therefore, the 
Court seemingly suggested that any “judicial gloss” on the statutory vacatur grounds cannot 
include a general legal review.  
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The parties’ express choice of state arbitration law might serve as another 
alternative for resolution of this conflict. For example, eight U.S. states have 
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law as their international arbitration statutes: 
California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oregon and 
Texas. 80  Model Law Article 34 vacatur provisions mirror the enforcement 
exceptions of the New York Convention and, therefore, provide the same 
standard of review. However, only Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana and Oregon 
adopted the Model Law in its entirety. The rest did not implement Chapter VII 
dealing with vacatur, presumably based on concerns over pre-emption by the 
FAA.81 Because the pre-emption issue as to vacatur standards remains uncertain, 
state law is unlikely to fill the gap effectively. 
4. ARE QUESTIONS OF CONTRACT FORMATION SUBJECT TO EFFECTIVE 
ARBITRATION UNDER THE FAA? 
In Janiga v. Questar Capital Corp.,82 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit recently faced the question of whether an arbitrator can decide on the 
formation of a contract containing an arbitration clause. In other words, can the 
arbitral tribunal effectively decide formation of the main or “container” contract 
in the same manner it decides validity? The Seventh Circuit held that the 
formation issue could only be answered by a court – and not by an arbitrator.83 
This issue had been expressly reserved by the Supreme Court in Buckeye84 and 
Rent-A-Center, 85  but Judge Wood stated that the Court had subsequently 
resolved the issue in Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters,86 decided just three days after Rent-A-Center. However, the impact of 
the Supreme Court’s Granite Rock decision is not necessarily as clear as the 
Janiga case suggests, and the application of separability to various questions of 




80  Calif. Civ. Pro. §§1287.12–1297.337; Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 50a-100–50a-139; Fla. Stat. §§ 
684.0001–684.0048; 710 ILCS 30/1-5–30/25-30; La. R.S. §§ 9:4241–9:4276; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 
1-567.31–1-567.67; ORS §§ 36.450–36.558; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 172.001–172.175. 
81  Jack Graves, ‘Arbitration as Contract: The Need for Fully Developed and Comprehensive Set of 
Statutory Default Legal Rules’, 2 William & Mary Bus. L. Rev. ___, ___ (forthcoming) (2011).  
82  2010 WL 3023945 (7th Cir. 2010). 
83  See generally Janiga, 2010 WL 3023945 (7th Cir. 2010). 
84  546 U.S. at 444, n. 1. 
85  130 S.Ct. at 2778, n. 2. 
86  130 S.Ct. 2847 (2010). 
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In Granite Rock, an employer sought to bring an action in court over the unions’ 
alleged violation of a “no-strike” clause in a collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”), which also contained an arbitration agreement.87 The central question 
was when the CBA was concluded. 88  If prior to the strike activities, the 
employer’s claim under the CBA was sound – if subsequent, then the CBA could 
not possibly bar the earlier strike activities.89 The employer, asserting early 
formation, wanted this question decided by a court, while the unions, asserting 
later formation, wanted it decided by an arbitrator.90 The problem of course was 
that each party’s position was logically flawed. If the CBA was in place before 
the strike, so was the arbitration agreement, which the employer wanted to avoid 
– if not, then neither was the arbitration agreement, which the unions wanted to 
rely upon. The Court presumably found the employer’s argument less flawed 
than the unions’ and held that the date of formation of the CBA was an issue for 
a court.91 
 
One might conclude, as the Seventh Circuit did, that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Granite Rock suggests that formation of the main contract is always 
an issue for a court. However, the Court’s actual reasoning in Granite Rock is not 
particularly clear on this point. First, the language in Granite Rock cited by Judge 
Wood in Janiga is arguably mere dicta. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority 
in Granite Rock, simply reiterates the basic rule that certain threshold matters are 
“generally” for the courts to decide, citing First Options and AT&T, and then 
noting the specific reservation of questions involving formation in Buckeye.92 
None of these principles is particularly new or noteworthy. Moreover, 
immediately following its articulation of these established principles, the Court 
noted that they only answered “whether” the main contract was concluded – not 
“when,” as required in the instant case.93 In view of the fact that it was logically 
impossible for the unions to win, unless there was no CBA at the time of the 
disputed strike activities, it is perhaps understandable that the Court denied the 
 
87 Granite Rock, 130 S.Ct. at 2853. 
88  Id. at 2856. 
89  Id. at 2854, 2861. 
90  Id. at 2856. 
91  Id. at 2860. 
92  See id. at 2855-56. This is precisely the material cited in Janiga. See Janiga, 2010 WL 3203945 
at 5. 
93  See Granite Rock, 130 S.Ct. at 2856 (explaining that each of the parties had conceded both 
formation and validity of the CBA, leaving only the question of when it was concluded). 
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unions’ right to submit the issue to arbitration.94 However, this unique case 
involving solely the “timing” of formation would hardly seem to provide a 
conclusive answer with respect to the authority of arbitrators to decide formation 
issues, generally. 
 
Absent a “delegation” provision, any question involving the formation, validity, 
or scope of the arbitration clause, itself, must be decided by a court.95 However, 
issues involving the validity of the main contract – but not specifically related to 
the arbitration clause – are solely for the arbitrator to decide.96 In effect, the 
arbitration clause is “presumed” valid, absent an issue of validity specific to the 
arbitration clause.97 This is simply a classic application of the doctrine of 
separability. The question, then, is “under what circumstances, if any, might the 
Supreme Court give effect to a similar ‘presumption’ allowing an arbitrator to 
decide issues involving the formation of the main contract under the FAA?” 
 
This is more than a casual hypothetical question. At least one institution includes 
“formation” within the scope of its model arbitration clause for international 
agreements, 98  and the “delegation” clause in Rent-A-Center also included 
“formation” within its scope.99 In each case, an arbitrator is asked to decide on 
the “formation” of the contract “containing” the arbitration clause that grants the 
 
94  Normally, a claimant attempts to invoke an arbitration clause in a contract it seeks to enforce, 
generally, and the respondent challenging jurisdiction will assert that the parties never 
concluded any contract and cannot, therefore, have concluded an arbitration agreement. In 
contrast, in Granite Rock, the unions were trying to invoke arbitration, but simultaneously 
arguing that the CBA had not been concluded at the time. Without even reaching the 
separability issue, a court might reasonably have barred the unions’ argument on the basis of 
estoppel. 
95  Granite Rock, 130 S.Ct. at 2856; Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84; see also 9 U.S.C. § 4. 
96  Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 449; see also Janiga, 2010 WL 3023945 at 6-7 (having determined that the 
parties had in fact concluded a main contract, explaining further that any questions of the 
enforceability of that contract were reserved for determination by the arbitrator). 
97  See First Options, 514 U.S. at 944-45 (explaining the normal “presumption” in favour of 
arbitration with respect to issues of scope); Rent-A-Center, 130 S.Ct. at 2785 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (acknowledging that the doctrine of separability first announced in Prima Paint 
provides that an arbitrability is “presumptively valid,” notwithstanding the invalidity of the main 
contract within which it is found). In effect, the doctrine of separability provides for 
presumptive validity of the arbitration agreement, as long as it meets the minimal requirements 
of FAA section 2, and absent a specific invalidity attack on the arbitration agreement itself. 
98  The JAMS Model International Arbitration Clause provides for arbitration of: “Any dispute, 
controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, including the formation, . . ..” 
JAMS Guide to Dispute Resolution Clauses for Commercial Contracts (2006). 
99  See supra note 44. 
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tribunal its authority. Reliance on such a clause to decide formation of the main 
contract unquestionably involves bootstrapping. However, it is also the only way 
to give effect to the intent expressed in the clause that an arbitrator should decide 
contract formation issues. Unless the doctrine of separability can save the 
arbitration clause from a determination that the main contract was never formed, 
then the arbitrator can only decide the issue one way – in favour of formation. 
Any decision that the main contract was never concluded would necessarily 
require dismissal of the matter for lack of jurisdiction, without any conclusive 
award on the issue of formation. Thus, the ability of parties to provide for 
arbitration of contract formation issues – without completing an entirely separate 
prior arbitration agreement100 – is fully dependent on whether the doctrine of 
separability can save an arbitration clause from a determination that the main 
contract was never concluded. 
 
The Supreme Court might ultimately decide the issue as suggested by the 
Seventh Circuit – laying down a bright line rule that issues of container contract 
formation are always for the court. However, the Court’s strong pro-arbitration 
bias might suggest otherwise, and, if the Court rejects a unitary approach denying 
the arbitrator’s jurisdiction on this issue, it might take either of two possible 
approaches – each of which is considered briefly below. The Court might simply 
set out a “pro-arbitration” unitary standard giving rise to the “presumption” the 
parties agreed to arbitration in virtually any formation dispute involving a 
contract with an arbitration clause (Part 4.1.), or it might take a more nuanced 
approach, looking for specific indications of at least implied consent giving rise 
to this “presumption” on a case-by-case basis (Part 4.2.). 
4.1. If You Touch It, You Bought It 
Arbitration is, ultimately, all about giving effect to the intentions of the parties.101 
In determining the parties’ intent, courts must apply ordinary contract law 
principles,102 including a presumption in favour of arbitrability in determining 
“whether” the parties have agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute.103 In the case 
 
100 This could of course be accomplished through a “framework agreement” governing a defined 
range of subsequent and fully independent agreements. 
101 The only significant exception involves limits on subject matter arbitrability, which are very 
narrow under U.S. law – especially in an international context. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
102 First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. 
103 See supra note 98. 
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of a dispute over the viability of the container contract, those general principles 
present a dilemma. On one hand, the extension of separability to the issue of 
formation would provide for enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a 
contract that the arbitrator ultimately finds was never concluded. On the other 
hand, a failure to apply separability under these circumstances allows a court to 
decide that a contract has been concluded – in direct contradiction to the 
arbitration clause within that contract providing that contract formation issues are 
to be determined by an arbitrator. As noted above, in Part 2.1., the Court has 
resolved this dilemma in favour of arbitration,104 and there is arguably no 
principled reason for reaching any different conclusion with respect to issues of 
formation105 – especially when the parties’ arbitration agreement specifically 
includes this issue within its scope. To do otherwise, would deny effect to the 
parties’ express intentions. 
 
In determining whether a presumption for or against arbitration of a particular 
issue was appropriate, the Court has framed the issue as whether the “contracting 
parties would likely have expected a court” or arbitrator to decide the issue.106 
Parties engaged in negotiating a contract containing a provision requiring 
arbitration of formation disputes likely would have expected exactly that – 
arbitration of formation – unless one of the parties expressly stated a contrary 
intent. Thus, a failure to conclude the container agreement should not affect the 
viability of the arbitration agreement, absent specific objection to the arbitration 
agreement itself. Under this unitary approach, the issue of non-formation of the 
container agreement would be treated just like invalidity of the container 
agreement, provided the purported contract at issue contained an arbitration 
agreement that included contract “formation” within its scope, and absent any 
specific objection to that arbitration agreement.  
4.2. Looking For Some Form of Implied Consent 
Alternatively, the Court might take a more nuanced case-by-case approach, 
looking for at least some specific form of implied consent before presuming a 
 
104 Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 448-49. In Buckeye, the Court saw no reason to distinguish between void 
and voidable contracts, id. at 448, which might also suggest a unitary approach to the formation 
issue. 
105 Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage, Fouchard, Gaillard, and Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer, 1999), 210-11. 
106 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 83-84. 
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party actually consented to arbitrate issues of contract formation. A few potential 
examples are illustrative of such an approach. 
 
In some transactions, the parties will negotiate a contract by exchanging 
proposed drafts until they are satisfied with a final document, which they will 
then execute. However, such negotiations will also sometimes break down prior 
to any formal signing, in which case one of the parties may assert that a binding 
contract has already been concluded. If an arbitration clause is included at the 
outset or added during the drafting process, and the other party makes proposed 
changes to the agreement without specifically addressing or objecting to the 
arbitration clause, then one might reasonably find implied consent to this clause 
as an autonomous agreement providing for arbitration of their subsequent dispute 
over contract formation. 
 
Other transactions may involve a distinct “offer,” subject to acceptance by a 
potential contracting partner. If this offer contains an arbitration clause, and a 
dispute arises over whether the offer was effectively accepted, the issue of 
implied consent may depend on whether it is invoked by the party making or 
receiving the offer. For example, suppose an offeror sought to revoke an offer 
that included an arbitration clause, while the offeree asserts that it accepted the 
offer before any revocation. It seems reasonable to presume that the offeror has 
impliedly consented to arbitration of this formation question, absent a contrary 
indication specific to the arbitration agreement.107 In contrast, if the offeror is 
seeking to enforce the purported contract in arbitration, and the offeree is 
asserting it never agreed to anything at all, it is much more difficult to find 
implied consent of the offeree to arbitrate sufficient to give rise to any sort of 
presumption. 
 
A more complex question might arise with a “battle of forms” in which each 
party’s form includes a different arbitration clause. For example, in a sale of 
goods transaction governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for 
the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”), the parties’ exchange of forms 
including different arbitration provisions would not create a binding contract.108 
However, either party’s performance may give rise to a contract on the other’s 
terms.109 To the extent this “formation” issue is disputed, it seems easy to imply 
 
107 This particular scenario was the subject of the 15th Annual Vis International Commercial 
Arbitration Moot. 
108 See CISG Article 19. 
109 See CISG Article 18. 
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consent to arbitration, generally. However, it is more difficult to imply the 
performing party’s consent to the other’s specific arbitration agreement, absent a 
finding that the parties concluded the main contract. In fact, where the arbitration 
agreement is at least one of the bases for the parties’ failure to conclude a 
contract through their exchange of forms, the performing party might reasonably 
argue that its own form amounts to a specific rejection of the other party’s 
arbitration clause, thereby, specifically precluding formation of the arbitration 
agreement. 
 
One could of course imagine many other potential variations on the 
circumstances of contract formation. However, basic notions of contractual 
consent would seem to provide the necessary tools for this more nuanced 
approach to seeking implied consent as a basis for a presumption that the parties 
intended to arbitrate issues of formation. Of course, parties seeking to arbitrate 
formation would be well advised to include this issue specifically within the 
scope of the arbitration agreement, as implying such consent would seem 
considerably more challenging under a general scope clause. Finally, it’s worth 
noting that an agreement providing for arbitration of formation issues (relating to 
the container contract) might also include a “delegation” clause, which itself 
includes issues of formation of the arbitration agreement – as did the Rent-A-
Center clause – in which case this entire determination would be arguably 
unreviewable. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center has now firmly established a contractual 
version of competence-competence under the U.S. FAA, including the 
application of separability to jurisdictional decisions made pursuant to a valid 
“delegation” agreement. The tribunal’s authority to decide such jurisdictional 
issues appears to be final and largely unreviewable under Hall Street, which 
creates a significant gap or inconsistency between FAA section 10 governing 
vacation of awards and New York Convention Article V governing enforcement. 
The Court’s continued development and expansion of the presumption of 
arbitrability further suggests the possibility that it may in the future extend 
separability to issues of contract formation – at least in cases in which such 
formation issues are included within the scope of the parties’ arbitration 
agreement. All of this, however, remains largely speculative inasmuch as the 
FAA, itself, provides little guidance until the Supreme Court decides to tell us 
what the statute means. 
 
